Threat model

Who can see what you do online, with and without a VPN

Network privacy is often discussed as if there were a single observer, and a VPN is often described as if it removed that observer. Neither description is accurate. A single request from your laptop to a website passes several independent parties, each of which learns something different, so the exposure is best assessed one party at a time.

This guide lists them and states what each learns with and without a tunnel. The conclusion is more qualified than the usual description of a VPN: a tunnel does not remove an observer but moves the observation to a different party.

What HTTPS already protects without a tunnel

Traffic to mainstream websites is encrypted in transit by default. A network operator observing a modern HTTPS session cannot read the page you requested, the form you submitted or the credentials you sent, and a VPN neither strengthens nor weakens that protection.

What remains visible is metadata, chiefly the name of the host you are contacting. That name is usually visible during the handshake that sets up the encryption, and the DNS lookup that preceded it is often visible too. An observer on the path can therefore build a list of the services your device contacted, when, and roughly how much data was exchanged, without learning anything about the contents.

A tunnel mainly changes who can see which hosts you contacted, not who can read what you sent. That is a narrower benefit than is often claimed, but a meaningful one, because a list of the hosts contacted over an evening is informative on its own.

The local network and its operator

The operator of the network you join is the closest observer and often the least accountable. In a café, hotel or airport, the operator may be the venue, a contractor or a hardware vendor running a cloud management service.

Without a tunnel, the operator is positioned to see every hostname your device resolves and every address it connects to. It can also redirect DNS lookups to its own resolver, as many captive portals do by default.

With a tunnel running, that view narrows to an encrypted session with one address and the volume and timing of the traffic. The operator can still tell that a VPN is in use, because a persistent encrypted flow to a single endpoint is a recognisable pattern, and it still sees the hardware (MAC) address your device presents on the network.

The tunnel does not hide the device itself from other devices on the same network. Where client isolation is not enabled, as is often the case on hotel and holiday-rental networks, other devices can see that yours is present and probe the services it offers. That exposes the device, not your browsing, and the remedy is a firewall with file sharing turned off.

The internet service provider

Without a tunnel, your internet service provider (ISP) has the broadest and most durable view of any party. Every connection from your line passes through it, for as long as the account is open.

It sees which hosts you contact and when, and it usually operates the resolver that answers your DNS lookups. Unlike a café operator, it knows exactly whose account the traffic belongs to, because it bills that account. What a particular ISP keeps, and for how long, depends on its own policy and on the law where it operates.

With a tunnel, the ISP's view shrinks to roughly what the café operator sees: an account holding a long-lived encrypted session to one address, with volumes and timings, and the network that owns that address, which may identify it as a VPN server. The list of hosts is no longer visible to it, and that substitution is the main benefit most VPN users obtain.

The trade-off: the observation moves to the exit server

Your traffic has to leave the tunnel somewhere to reach its destination, and the server that forwards it must know where it is going. The exit server is therefore, by design, in the position your ISP used to occupy: it handles the onward connections and is able to list them.

The accurate description is an exchange. Without a tunnel, the local network and the ISP see the list of hosts, and the destination sees your home or mobile IP address. With a tunnel, those two parties see an encrypted session to one address, the exit server is positioned to see the destinations, and the destination sees the exit server's address. No observer is removed; one is substituted for another.

Whether the exchange is worthwhile depends on comparing the two parties. An ISP knows which account the traffic belongs to because it bills it, and it sits on the line for as long as the line exists. A VPN provider also knows an account, since a subscription is tied to an email address, and it does not see less by nature. What it can do is publish what it keeps, field by field, and be held to that statement.

On a shared network the comparison is more one-sided. On hotel Wi-Fi, for example, the party you displace is a hotspot operator you cannot identify, and for most people that exchange is an improvement. It remains an exchange, however, not a disappearance from the network.

The destination and the services it shares data with

The destination sees your request, because it is the other end of the connection. Without a tunnel it sees your public IP address, which maps to an approximate location and an ISP; with one it sees the exit server's address, which maps to that server's city and the network that operates it. That is the whole of what changes at this end.

Everything else the destination knows is unaffected. A signed-in session identifies your account directly, and cookies set on an earlier visit identify the same browser. Fingerprinting can still distinguish your device by combining screen dimensions, fonts, time zone, language, graphics behaviour and other attributes, none of which depends on your IP address.

A site can also detect inconsistencies, such as a browser time zone that does not match the location of the IP address, and treat the mismatch itself as a signal. The same applies to the analytics and advertising services to which a page passes data.

DNS-level blocking removes some of those services entirely by refusing the lookup for their domains. It cannot help where a tracker is served from the same domain as the content you requested, because the decision is made on the name, and that name was needed.

Each party compared, with and without a tunnel

The list below summarises the same parties, stating what each learns without a tunnel and then with one.

  • Local network operator. Without a tunnel: every hostname you resolve and every address you contact, and the ability to redirect DNS lookups. With a tunnel: an encrypted session to one address, its volume and timing, and the fact that a VPN is in use.
  • Other devices on that network. Without a tunnel: that your device is present, which services it offers and, on an open or compromised network, the hostnames and unencrypted traffic it sends. With a tunnel: that your device is present and which services it offers, and encrypted traffic they cannot interpret.
  • Internet service provider. Without a tunnel: the list of hosts over years, usually the DNS lookups as well, linked to a billing identity. With a tunnel: one encrypted session to one address, and which network owns that address.
  • WrapVPN's exit server. Without a tunnel: nothing, because it is not on the path. With a tunnel: the position to see every address it forwards traffic to.
  • Destination website. Without a tunnel: your public IP address, approximate location and ISP. With a tunnel: the exit server's address and its city. Unchanged either way: your signed-in account, cookies and the device fingerprint.
  • Advertisers and analytics services used by the site. Without a tunnel: whatever the page passes to them. With a tunnel: the same, minus domains refused at resolution when Clean Web is on. A changed IP address is a weak defence against identification that never relied on the address.

What no network-layer tool affects

A VPN acts on the path between your device and a destination. Four of the most significant exposures are not on that path, and no tunnel from any provider affects them.

Being signed in is the largest: a service you are signed in to knows who you are, and the tunnel sits behind the sign-in, not in front of it. Stored identifiers such as cookies are the second, because they travel with your browser and survive a change of IP address.

Fingerprinting is the third, and it is designed to work without any stable network identifier. The fourth is the device itself: malware, a compromised browser extension, a device management profile or physical access all observe from inside the endpoint, where traffic has already been decrypted so that you can read it.

Separate browser profiles, blocking third-party storage and keeping the device secure are not alternatives to a tunnel, because they address different exposures. For most people, those exposures account for the larger share of the risk.

Reasons a demanding threat model may rule out WrapVPN

Two facts should weigh against WrapVPN if your threat model is demanding. They are stated here because they cannot be discovered from outside.

The first is key custody. Our server issues the tunnel configuration, including the private key, so your device does not generate its own key pair and keep the private key locally. The exit server you connect to generates the key pair and holds the private key in memory for as long as your device's peer exists on it, without writing it to disk. We therefore hold the private key as well as the public key. If your model requires that the private key never exist outside your device, treat this as disqualifying.

The second is what happens while the tunnel is not running. There is no kill-switch setting on any platform. Traffic can therefore leave outside the tunnel before you connect or, on iPhone, iPad and Mac, before Auto-Connect brings the tunnel up; while the connection is paused; during a change of server location; after you disconnect; and for about two seconds when the Android or Windows app restarts the tunnel after a long interruption. During those periods the local network and ISP again see hostnames. On iPhone, iPad and Mac, a connection that an app opened before the tunnel started can also continue outside the tunnel until it closes. On Windows, a firewall rule blocks traffic outside the tunnel while the tunnel is running, but it does not apply in those intervals.

Pausing is the deliberate form of the same state, and it uses fixed intervals: 5, 15 or 30 minutes on iPhone, iPad and Mac; 5, 15 or 60 minutes on Android; and 1, 5, 15 or 60 minutes on Windows. The apps also offer a complete disconnection, and an unplanned interruption has no safeguard behind it.

Applying this model when choosing a provider

The useful question is not whether a provider offers privacy, but which observer you want removed and whether you would rather be seen by the party that replaces it. On hotel and airport networks during a period of travel, you are displacing an operator you cannot identify, and a provider that publishes what it records is the more accountable party. If your concern is your ISP at home, the exchange is narrower and the provider's policy deserves careful reading. If your concern is advertisers, the network layer can do part of the work by refusing lookups for known advertising and tracking domains, but signed-in accounts, cookies and fingerprinting have to be addressed in the browser.

Three questions distinguish providers on this point, and none concerns server counts: what is recorded, field by field; what happens when the tunnel stops; and where the key material is generated. A provider that answers all three precisely is indicating how it will behave later.

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Common questions

Can my internet provider see which websites I visit when a VPN is on?

Not for traffic carried in the tunnel. Your provider sees an encrypted session to a single address, with its volume and timing, and can tell that a VPN is in use. On iPhone, iPad and Mac, a connection that an app opened before the tunnel started can continue outside the tunnel until it closes, and your provider can see where that connection goes. The list of hosts moves to the exit server, which does the forwarding, so the observation is relocated, not eliminated.

If HTTPS already encrypts everything, what does a VPN add?

HTTPS protects the contents of a session end to end, and a tunnel neither improves nor weakens that. Without a tunnel, what remains visible is which hosts your device contacted and when, usually including the DNS lookups. A VPN hides that list from the local network and your ISP and hides your IP address from the destination; it changes metadata, not contents.

Does a VPN make me anonymous?

No, and no network-layer tool can. The destination still knows your signed-in account, still reads cookies from earlier visits and can still distinguish your device by fingerprinting, none of which depends on your IP address. A tunnel changes which network parties see your destinations and which address the destination sees.

Is café Wi-Fi a risk if the website is encrypted?

The contents are protected, so the risk is not that someone reads your messages over the air. The operator can see the list of hosts your device contacts and can redirect DNS lookups through its own resolver, and it is a party you cannot identify or hold to a policy. That is the situation in which a tunnel helps most.

Does blocking trackers at the DNS level hide me from advertisers?

Partly, and only where the tracker uses its own hostname. With Clean Web on, the resolver refuses lookups for domains on its advertising and tracking blocklist, so apps that use the system resolver open no connection to those domains. A tracker served from the same domain as the content is not caught, because the decision is made on the name. Clean Web is on by default on Android and off by default on iPhone, iPad, Mac and Windows, and while it is on, the app shows a count of refused lookups.

What happens if the tunnel stops without my noticing?

Your traffic returns to the ordinary path, and the local network and ISP again see hostnames. On iPhone, iPad, Mac and Android, nothing blocks traffic while the tunnel is down, and the Windows app blocks traffic outside the tunnel only while the tunnel is running. A pause is the deliberate version: 5, 15 or 30 minutes on iPhone, iPad and Mac, where the app shows that protection is paused; 5, 15 or 60 minutes on Android; and 1, 5, 15 or 60 minutes on Windows.

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